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TELEVISED TRIALS: PAST AND PRESENT 
Grant Greer 
H. Pres to n Thomas , Advisor 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early fifties, the television media sought to cover criminal 
t.Lials with television cameras . l\ few states allowed some television 
coverage, but they were a minority. One of these states, Texas, made 
constitutional history when it a llo wed the television coverage of the 
criminal trial of Bil lie Estes in 1962 . The case had been appeal ed all 
the way to the Supreme Court , whe r e his conviction had been reversed 
because of the television coverage of his trial. The Supreme Court's 
holding in that case had been rather ambiguous because one justice in 
the five - man majority , while agreeing with the result reached by the 
olher four justi ces , discgreed with Lhe scope of their decision . 
Despite the ail'lbiguity of the Estes decision , the period of time 
following the 1965 decision to the mid-seventies was characte r ized by 
the prohibi ti on of televised trials by most sta te s . Only Co lo rado an d 
Texas a llowed t elevised trials durin g this perio d, and Texas gave in to 
pressure from TV trial critics and banned tele v is e d trials in 197 6 . 
The po st- Estes latency period ended in 1975 when several states be gan 
allow in g televised trials. Unli ke the tel ev ised trials of the previous 
era, these new tel evise d trial programs were carefully laid out ahead 
of time under the ausp i ces of the highest court in each s t a t e . By 1980, 
more states allowed televi sed trial s than didn ' t . This explosion in 
televised trials was condoned by the United Sta tes Supreme Court in 1981 
decision in Chandler v Florida . 
1 
Thus, televised tria l s have been allowed in two pe ri ods : an early 
period during the fifties and ear l y sixties and the present period which 
began in the mid - seventies. The one ux~cption to this two - period analysis 
of televised trials is Colorado which adopted its present p r ogram of 
televised trial in 1956. Colorado is unusual in another respect . Although 
it was one of the first states to allow televised trials, it adopted a 
program more like the present state proqrarns than the sporadic experimental 
trials of the fifties and sixties. 
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Cl!l\I'TI~E I 
THE FIRST TELEVISED TRIALS: AN E~A OF 
SPORADIC EXPERP1ENTATION 
A 1955 murder trial in Waco, Texas, was covered by television news-
reel cameras in one of the firs t experiments conducted with televised 
trials. The local bar association, whi,ch had conducted the experiment, 
prepared and published a repor t on the trial which indicated that the 
presence of the television cameras a·d not have any detrimental effect 
on the trial. In fact, the bar association said the presence of the 
cameras had dignified the proceedings somewhat . 1 Ten years lat er the 
United States Supreme Court condemned a televised trial from the same 
state . The ten year period between those two trials was characterized 
by sporadic experimentation with televised trials by various state courts. 
In those states where televisio1 coverage of court proceedings was 
allowed, it was a one-time experiment in the midst of prohibitions. 
Each televised trial was rather unique, conducted under such regulations 
(or the lack of them) as determined by individual trial judges . In 
addition, television coverage of court proceedings was allowed by only 
a small minority of states . Co lora do is the only state which has 
consistently allowed televised trials since the 1950's. Texas allowed 
televised trials until the mid 70 ' s . 2 Oklahoma had allowed a trial in 
1958 to be televised, but, by 1966, it was one of the forty - eight sta t es 
which prohibited televised trials. 3 
3 
This rather sporadic pattern of televised trials was the trademark 
of the time . There was no standard proced ure for conducting televised 
trials . In fi:ict , there was not even a y agreement on the issue of 
whether or not trials should be televis ed at all . The result was a 
general confusion over the issue . Few seemed to know exactly what to do 
when the issue came up. This chaos was well described by Dr." 1verner 
Hartenberger : 
The autonomy of an individual court of la w to establish a 
policy, consistent ,vith its own opinion of the role of 
television and p hotography in court procedu r e, resulted 
in a doctrine that varied from state to state. 1vhile the 
judiciary in Colorado endorsed supervised television cov-
erage of court ~roceedings , the judiciaries in the majority 
of states remained in opposition, and while Dr . Sam Sheppard 
was being tried before a judiciary that was undecided about 
the effects the media had on his trial, a judge in Portland, 
Oregon , authorized photographers to take ~ict ures during a 
murder trial at any time (as long as none were !ith flash 
buJbs) from front bench seats in the courtroom . 
Dr. Hartenberger went on to say that the "confusion of the judiciary was 
compoundE:'d by the already apparent uncertainty of the bar, press, and 
. s lay commura ty . " 
Lyles v State : A Small Success 
The situation described by Dr. Har tenberger can better be understood 
by considerin9 a few of these early TV trials . One such trial occurred 
in Oklahoma in 1958. Edward Lyles was convicted of second-degree bur-
6 glary in Oklahoma County . He appealed on the grounds that television 
cameras which had been permitted in the courtroom had prejudiced his 
trial and denied his constitut ional rights, These cameras had not done 
any filming durin g the actual proceedings but only during the recesses. 
When Mr. Lyles objected to the camer as , the judge ordered the television 
crews to stop shooting, although he refused to do anything about the 
pictu r es they had t a ken before the defendant's objection was rai se d. 7 
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When the appeal reached Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the conviction 
(and the use of t ele vision at a trial ) was upheld. 
The Ok l ahoma Court upheld the convic tion because the "trial court 
did not abuse its descretion in permitting television cameras in the 
courtroom a nd the tak ing of pictures . 8 (was) not p rejudicial." 
The sign.:_ f icant factor was not whether TV coverage of trials in and of 
itself was prejudicial but whet her or not t he trial judge had allowed 
the news media in the court to go too far . A s t andard of reasonableness 
was applied . Since the appe llate court held tha t the judge was reasonable 
in llowing th e cameras in the courtroom and the r es trictions he imposed 
on the medi a were reas onabl e , the t rial was a fair on e , and no constitutional 
rights were denied . 
The Cou rt of Appeals defined re aso n ab le in both general i deologi cal 
and specif ic procedura l terms. An ideological question considered by 
the court was whether there was a com pe lling reason for admitting cameras 
into the courtroom. The court felt that freedom of the press included 
the ri ght of the broadcast media to attend and report on co u rt proceedings 
and that denying television the same privileges whi ch the pr i nted media 
enjoye d ''would constitute unwarranted discrimination . 119 
p ro cedures employed . For in s tance , one procedure v,hich it considered 
essential was the existence of a " kill" button on the bench . This i s 
:1 b1_t-ton ,.:..::hin tl'e .::-each _f the juc.ce whic:1. ·,·;~er, ~epressed, •·1ou"'...d 
- -- . - . 
-------
-· . 
that this was necessary for the trial judge to maintain absolute control 
f j- d . 10 o tie procee ings. 
While the appellate court later suggested certain standards of 
conduct for the trial , it also admitted: 
... the matter of televisi~g or not televising, photographing or r.ot 
photographing criminal trials and proceedings, subject to the here-
inbcfore sugrestcd standards , is within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge . 1 (emphasis added) 
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What were these "h ereinbefore suggested standards? " One was the "kill" 
button re q 1.1i::ement. It was also recommended that the press "pool" 
faci lities and that microphones be installed in such a way as to "minimize" 
distraction .'' For live telecasts, the cameras were to be concealed 
behind a wal l. 
lvhile some standards provided by the Oklahoma Court of Ap_peals 
were re latively prccise--the pooling requirement , for instance--others 
were quite vague . For example , the standards regarding microphone place-
ment ':Jere rather ambiguous . The tri al judge was instructed to see that 
the microphones were not pu t in a distracting place, yet he was the one 
who ultimately determined what would be distracting . Presumably he would 
take time before the trial to confer with the media and decide on the 
best possib le placement of microphones, but he was not required to . That 
is , the standard was vague enough to include half - hearted efforts at 
media control as well as more serious attempts . 
The Oklahoma's court's standards were provided in the narrow 
cont xt of the case before it. Thus, the standards provided were 
applicable to the Lyles case but not necessarily to another case which 
had occurred under different circumstances. For example, the Oklahoma 
Ccurt provided standards for the placement of cameras which would 
broadcast live . It said nothing about the placement of film cameras 
which would record proccccings for later broadcast. This limitation 
is not unusual. It is, in fact, th e normal procedure for an appellate 
court. Still, it has its drawbacks when a court is trying to provide 
comprehensive standards for the televising of a trial. Seventeen years 
after the Lyles decision was rendered state courts realized this and 
began to formu lat e procedures in quasi-legislative hearings before a 
trial was televised. (Colorado, of course, used such a procedure in 
1956 , twenty years before the other states.) 
One raight view the Lyles case as characteristic of many of the 
7 
early televised trials and conclude that the above obs ervat ions are 
applicable to most, if not all, of the TV tri·ls of the time. There 
arc problems with this, however. Each of the televised trials was 
conducted under its O¼m set of rules, and each was a different experience . 
Nevertheless , one statement can be made about the Lyles case in compar-
ison to the other trials of the time: it was qui te well handled. The 
trial judge had exercised caution when he allowed cameras into his 
court , and he had constantly monitered them, tell~ng them when they could 
take pictures and when they could not. Not all of the early TV trials 
were conducted with such care. In the 1962 trial of Billie Sol Estes , 
the television coverage was poo rl y handled . The Estes case, however , 
was atypical in it s own right , for it was the first televised trial to 
be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. 
8 
Estes v Texas 
This landmark case began in a district court in Tyler, Texas. The 
defendant, Billie Sol Estes, was convicted of swindling some farmers. 
On September 24, 1962, the trial was scheduled to begin, but the defense 
att.orney objected to the presence of the television cameras and asked 
that they be removed. The judge refused. The defense then asked that 
h . 1 b d 1 d d h . d d h' · 12 t e tria e e aye , an t e JU ge gran te tis motion. While the 
hearing on these two motions was in progress, television and still 
cameramen took pictures of the scene. Radio and television broadcasted 
the proceedings live. Justice Clark described this scene in the Supreme 
Court 's decision : 
Indeed , at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom 
throughout the hearing, taking motion and still pictures 
and televising the proceedings . Cables and wires were 
snaked acros the courtroom floor, three microphones were 
on the judge's bench and others were beam e d at the jury 
box and the counsel table. It is conceded that the act-
ivities of the television cre\vS and news photographers 
led to considerable disruption of the hearings. 13 
In short, television cameramen "ran wild" during the proceeding. (For 
pictures of the scene at the hearing, see Appendix 1, pictures 1 & 2.) 
Although this hearing was not a trial, it was originally supposed 
to be one. Only after the defense brought up its motions was the trial 
postponed and the proceeding turned into a pre-trial hearing. When the 
actual trial was held, many more restrictions were placed on the press , 
but, if the trial had been held when scheduled , it would probably have 
been held in the same atmosphere in which th e pre - trial hearing was 
held : with newsmen and cameras all over the room, with bright " stud io" 
lights and with microphones sticking their snouts into the faces of 
trial participants. In short, it seemed that the trial judge had taken 
very few measures beforehand to assure that the press equipment would be 
as unobtrusive as possible. By not placing restrictions on the press, 
<) 
the trial judge lacked that control over the proceed ings which the Oklahoma 
Court in the Lyles case felt was so important. 
When the Estes case finally did come to trial in October of 1962, the 
trial judge had ordered the media to build a booth in the back of the 
courtroom and paint it to match t he courtroom wa lls as much as possible. 
The cameras were to be housed in thi s booth, with their lenses stick i ng 
out of a slit which ran the length of the booth (see Appendix 1, 
picture 3). Furthermore, the judge allowed live broadcasts onl y of the 
attorney's arguments nd the delivery of the jury's verdict--not of the 
testimony and cross-examination of any witnesses. Videotapes were 
allowed but without sound. For the second day of the trial, t he judge 
ordered that the slit in the camera booth be made narrower so that 
the cameras would be harder to see (Appendix 1, picture 4). He 
seemed to be progressing towards a more reasonable televised trial, but 
on a trial-and-error basis. He was not acting, he was reacting . The 
Supreme Court noticed this progressive change in the rules of the game 
when it said that , "Because of continual objection , the rules governing 
live telecasting, as well as radio and still photos , were changed as 
. . . d . ,,14 the exigencies of the situation seeme to require . 
Although the Estes case was overturned by the United States Supreme 
Court and the Lyles case was upheld by Oklahoma's highest court, there 
were many similiarities. In both cases, the trial judge had ultimate 
discretion in deciding whether or not to televise the trial. In the 
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Lyles case, however, the trial judge had some limits on his discretion, 
a few of which were relatively clear procedural requirements. The 
Estes judge was granted discretion to televise or not to televise as he 
should desire by Canon 28 or the Integrated State Bar of Texas. Canon 
28 left the matter to the "sound discretion" of the trial judge, but also 
warned that a televised trial may affect the dignity oi the trial and 
. , . . l . . lS 
u1stracl tria po.rt1.c1.pants. In addition , it instructed that no "flash 
bulbs or other articifial lighting" be used and that no witnesses be 
1 . .1 . h ' . 16 te eviseu wit out tneir consent. With the exception of these two 
r ecommendati ons, the judge was left to make all other rules himself. 
The fact of the matter is that t. e judge was not given very much 
guidance by the Canon. The two explicitly stated guidel ines in Canon 28, 
while undoubtedly helpful to an extent, were aJso quite limited. The 
lighting requirement is little more than a statement of common sense . 
No judge in his ri 9ht mind would allow flashes in a courtroom. As for 
the requirement concerning witnesses, it is undoubtedly important, but 
it doesn't give the judge any guidance on how to televise. It only 
tells the judge what he cannot allow to be televised. In the Lyles 
case, however, standards such as th e requirement of a camera booth 
for all live broadcasts do help the judge in a procedural manner, yet 
it is a recommendation which the judge might not follow otherwise. 
In both the Lyles and Estes cases, the judges imposed restrictions 
on the media to keep the trial as fair as possible. The Lyles judge 
laid out guidelines from the start by allowing television coverage 
only duri1g recesses. The Estes judge strove to maintain the balance 
between the television coverage and the rights of the defendant by 
11 
eventually confining the cameras to a booth at the rear of the courtroom 
and limiting the live telecasts. Yet the progressive manner in which he 
imposed regulations let the damage be done, at least to a limited extent 
before the stricter regulations were put in force . Thus, it seems that 
the Lyles judge had done a bette r job of preserving the trial by setting 
his procedures out clearly at the on set of the trial . The firial regulations 
imposed by the Estes judge were probably fair. In fact, one of the 
justices in the Supreme Court's majority which condemned the Estes trial 
d h h l • ' II l • . 17 note tat t e te evision cameras were re atively unobtrusive." The 
problem was that these rules were not in force from the start of the 
trial, but were gradually imposed as it went along. 
The Estes and Lyles cases cannot be easily characterized as typical 
televised trials from the early era . But then, it is wrong to say that 
they do not fit in with the other trials of this period. It is just 
difficult to characterize any trial as typical of this period because 
of the tremendous variety of electronic coverage allowed. The Estes and 
Lyles cases represent the two ends of the spectrum of televised trials 
in this period. The Lyles trial was quite well administered by the trial 
judge and the media was strictly contr ol led. It shows that, while 
television coverage could prejudice a trial, it does not have to. On 
the other hand, the Estes case represents the lower end of the spectrum, 
where television coverage does seem to interfere with the trial. It 
is the examp l e of a poorly conducted trial--televi$ion showing its 
"mi sche ivious potentialities." When the two cases are put together, 
they show that, while television co verage can harm a trial, it doesn 't 
have to. When the Estes case made it to the United States Supreme Court, 
however , a different statement about televised trials came about . 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ESTES DECISION: AMBIGUOUS CONDBMNATION 
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction 
of Billie Estes because his trial had been televised without his consent , 
even though there was no proof that the presence of television cameras 
had harmed the fair administration of the trial. This result was 
carried by a bare majority o= five justices: a plurality of four and 
the concurrence of a fifth justice--J. Harlan . The plurality's decision 
was expressed in the majority opinion written by Justice Clark ' s majority 
opinion held that: 
The psychological impact of the use of television on all 
the participants in a trial was inherently prejudicial and 
of such an incalculable nature that its use was fundamentally 
inconsistent with the constitutional concept of a fair trial. 
Thus, even absent a showing of actual prejudice, its use was 
a violation of due process of law. 111 
The Chief Justice wrote a separate opinion in which he expressed 
" additional view on why this is SO . II 2 Justice Harlan concurr ed in part 
but refused to say that all televised trials are per se unconstitutional 
because all televised trials were not before the court . "The Estes 
trial ," Har lan said, "was a heavily publicized and highly sensational 
affair. 113 For this reason, Har la n felt that the televising of the trial 
had been inherently unfair , even without a showing of harm directly 
caused by the TV coverage. Routine trials , however , might be televised 
without harm . Harlan simply refused to condemn all televised trials 
because tnlevision was shown to be inherently unconstitutional in a 
notorious and highly publ i cized cas e . 
13 
Four justices dissented be c ause the defense did not p ro ve , or even 
assert, that the television coverage had a detrimental effec t on the 
tri a l. '.!:'he dissenters were unwilling to assume "isolatable prejudice" 
harm to the trial directly caused by te levision coverage -- "in the absense 
d 
of any evidence that Estes did not r eceiv e a fair trial."· 
The holding of the Estes case is ambiguous because the majority 
itself was split between condemn ing all televised trials , as the p lurality 
did , and condemning only the televising of a "highly sensational" trial, 
as Justice Harlan did . Since there could have been no majority without 
Harlan's concurrence, the Harlan opinion becomes the most important 
single opinion in the case, and it limits th e scope of the holding of 
5 
the case. This lack of consensus in the court undoubtedly paved the 
. . 6 
way for the reentry or television in courtrooms Ln the late seventies. 
l\t a.ny r.:ite , it is cleur that the Estes dccisioll did not cause any mass 
prohibitions of tel e vised trials . The only two states which had allowed 
televised trials at the time of the Estes decision, Co lorado and Texas, 
continued to all.ow them for some years after the Su preme Court's 
decision. A clos er look at the decisions which made up the maj ority 
will show how this is so. 
The Plurality Decision 
One of the first things to be established by the plurality was the 
fact that there did not have to be any showing of "iso l atable prejudice" 
in order for the trial to be adve r sely affected by the television coverage . 
This wa s not neces sa ry because " at times a procedure employed by the 
State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is 
7 
deemed inherently lacking in due process ." 
The televising of the Estes trial was inherently unfair because of 
the impact it would have on trial participants . The first set of trial 
participants considered was the trial jurors . The plurality ' s concern 
in this area was threefold: that the presence of television would inter -
fere with the jurors in the performance of their duty , that it might 
prejudice the jury's verdict by exposing them to edited television 
coverage , and that televis ion broadcasts would prejudice potential 
jurors, thus making retrial impossible . 
The distraction argument hinged on the assumption that jurors 
would be self -con scious and thus concerned about what the cameras were 
recording. "We arc all self -consciou s and uneasy when being televised," 
the court said, "Humc:m nature being what it i s , not only will a juror's 
eyes be fixed on th e camera , but also l1is mind will be preoccupied with 
the telecasting rather than with the testimony . 118 
'.!'he plu rality also expressed concern that, in certain states where 
jurors did not have to be sequestered, they might go home and view 
excerpts of the trial on television . In the process, they would be 
re-exposed to the events of the trial, with one difference: what they 
would see on TV would be edited . As a result, certain pa rts of the t rial 
would be emphasized in the juror's mind. While this particu l ar argument 
was not applicable to the Estes case because the jurors had to be 
sequestered under Texas law, it could be app li ed hypothetically, by 
pretendiny the Estes jurors had not been sequestered . Due to the fact 
that Estes continually objected to b eing televised, the judge had 
prohibited the press from filming a ny of the arguments of the defense. 
As a re s ult, the trial coverage amou nted to "a public presentation of 
15 
only the state's side of the case. " 9 If a juror were allowed to go home 
and view this , it would be the argumcn ts of the prosecu tion, not t11e 
defense, which would be reinfo rced in his mind. In an extension of 
16 
this argument, the plurality said that television coverage of a trial 
would make it difficult to select new jurors if the case had to be retried . 
If, as in the Estes case, television coverage tends to favor 6ne side in 
the trial, potential jurors may be prejudiced before they are called to 
hear the retrial . 
Co .cern W'S also aired about the effect of television coverage on 
trial witnesses. He:re the just ice s seemed to be afraid of the unknown. 
They admitted that there would be no way of knowing what effect television 
coverage might have on witnesses ; however, they did feel that the 1rresence 
wou ld have some effect . It seemed to the plurality that the witnesses 
would be so distracted that the accuracy of th ei r Lestimony might be 
severly "undermined." Furthermore , the plurality said , witnesses might 
be approached on the street by hostile television viewers and harassed 
about their testimony. 
It seemed to the plurality that television coverage of a trial might 
have a significant impact on the trial judge. The court noted that it 
made th e judge ' s job more difficult by adding to the number of diff icu lt 
decisions he would have to make. The court seemed even more concerned, 
how ever , that television might be us ed as a political weapon against the 
judge, particularly where judges were e l ected. Tie picture painted by 
the opinion is one of a trial judge trying hi s best to do his job with 
television crews holding a club over his head , ready to swat him if he 
makes wh~t they consider to be a wrong decision . 
Most important ly , the p luralit y expressed concern for the defe ndant 
in a televised trial . They s aid: 
We cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the 
defendant . Its presence is a form of mental--if not physical--
harassment , resembling a po lic e line - up or a third degree. 
The inevitable close-ups of his gestures and expressions 
during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his 
personal sensibilities , his di gnity, and his ability to . 
concentrate on the proceed in gs before him- - somet in cs the 
difference between life and death--dispassionately, freely, 
and without the distraction of wide p ubl ic surveil lance. 10 
One look at picture 2 (see Appendix 1) of the Estes hearing seems to 
support this statement . Billie Estes sits uncomfortably on his chair, 
with his hand apparently trying to sheild his face from the cameras. 
The plurality put a great deal of emphasis on the obtrusiveness of 
17 
the television equipment -- especia ll y Just ic e Warren (who should be con-
sidered part of the p lu rality since his opinio1: is basica lly an elaboration 
of the pl rality ' s ideas .) This concern with the physica l appearance 
o: the equipment should not be misunderstood, however. It was considered 
significant only insofa r as it tend ed to increase psycho logical distraction 
of the trial participants . 
The Harlan Opinion-- One Man Majori t y 
While th e rhetor ic of the plurality s u ggested an unconditional 
con dem nation of all televised trials, the actual holding of the case 
wa s limite d by the reservations i n concurring Justice Harlan ' s se pa rate 
opinion . Harlan felt that the plurality ' s d ec i s ion was too broad. 
The precise ques tion is whether the Fourtee nth Amendment 
prohib its a State , over the objections of a defendant, from 
employing television in the courtroom to be televised 
contemporaneously, or sub sequently by mea n s of video-
tape, the co urtroom proceedings of a criminal trial of 
widespread interest . The issue is no narrower than 
this because petitione r has not asserted any isolatable 
prejudice resulting from the presence of television 
apparatus within the courtroom or from the contemporaneous 
or subsequent broadcasting of the trial procccdinqs . On 
the other hand, lhe issue is no broader , for we are concerned 
here only with a criminal trial of great notorie t y , and not 
with criminal proceedings of a more or less routine nature. 11 
This puts Harlan in an interesting positio n . He clearly considers the 
facts of the case, if only to determine whether or no t the trial is 
"of great notoriety. " Yet , if the trial is notorious , the reasoning 
of the plurality applies and the televised tri 1 is considered per se 
unconstitutional . Thus , Harlan's opinion fits between the Clark and 
Warren opinions, which condemned all televised trials, and the dissenting 
opinions, which would condemn a televised trial only if the facts showed 
"isolatable prejudice. " 
Harlan admitted that there may be no difference betwee n televising 
a notorious trial and one of a more or less routine nature. He made 
th e distinc~ion because he did not wish to keep the states from pursuing 
U 1 f d l ' ' II 12 a nove course o proce ura experimentation. 
Harlan also stresses a point briefly conceded by the majority--that 
their condemnation of telev i sed trials did not mean that TV would a lwa ys 
prejudice trials . This was a loo phole which would later allow the reentry 
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of television in to the courts of many states . Harlan managed to a cknowle dge 
this future for televised trials while condemning the Estes case in the 
same breath , 
Finally, we should not be deterred from mak in g the co nstit utiona l 
judgement which this case demands by the prospect that the day 
may come when television will have become so commonplace an 
affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate 
all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may 
disparage the judicial process . If and when that day arrives 
the constitutional judgement called for now would of course 
be subject to re-examination in accordance with the traditional 
workings of the Due Process Clause.13 
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CHAPTER III 
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATIO~'S 
CANON 35 
Whil e the Estes mandate was an official and somewhat half - hearted 
criticism of televised trials, the Americo.n Bar Association gave a much 
sharper criticism of TV trials in Canon 35 of the Canon ' s Judicial 
Ethics. The Canon docs not have any legal forces behind it. The Supreme 
Court in Estes had noted that : "Canon 35, of course , has of itself no 
binding effect on the courts but merely expresses the view of the 
Association in opposition to the bro ad asting, televising, and photo -
! . d. 1 gr.::i.p nng of court procee ings." 
The Canon was fi rst written in 1937, lon y befo re the first trial 
was tele vise d, as o. prohibition of still and newsreel cameras in court -
2 
rooms . It h.:id been inspired by the trial of Bruno Hauptmann , the 
Lindberg baby kidnapper, which had been photographed by four still 
3 
and three newsreel cameras. With two minor excep tions, the press had 
followed the trial judge's restrictions until it was discovered that 
one of the newsreel cameras had been photographing while the court was 
in session, instead of during recess es . When the judge heard this, he 
bnnned a y further camera coverage of the trial. It is interesting to 
note that the offending newsreel camera "h ad been so well soundproofed 
that the judge and public learned of the filming only when some of the 
4 
footage was released." Outside the courtroom , however , the scene was 
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different. Witnesses rep ea ted the highlights of their testimony for 
newsreel cameras outside the courtroom; the jury panel was confronted 
by a battery of photographers outside the courthouse; newspapers printed 
5 
"rumors convicting Hauptmann in their columns." Yet, in general , it ,vas 
l ·1 l h' h h . l. d 6 t1e press outsice t e courtroom w.1c gave t e tria its ba name. 
At any rate, out of the Hauptmann grew a trend in the American Bar 
Association for a statement on the control of can1eras in the courtroom. 
In September of 1937, this trend resulted in the adoption of Canon 35 : 
In 1952 , the Canon was amended to include television in its ban on 
7 
courtroom cameras. Clearly the errors of the press at the Hauptmann 
trial had played a significant role in the addition of television to the 
bcm , since, at that time o.f the revision, there had been pract ic ally 
no exper imentation with television covera g e of trials . A few minor 
revisions were made in 1963 (deleting some insignificant phrases) . As 
revised, the Canon reads as follows: 
Proceedings in the court should be conducted with fitting 
dignity and decorum . The taking of photographs in the court -
room , during sess ions of the court or recesses between sessions , 
and the broadcasting or te l evision of court proceedings detract 
partic i pants and witnesses in the giving testimony , and create 
misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of that public 
and should not be permited . 8 (emphasis added) 
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CHAPTER IV 
COLORADO-- THE EXCEPTION 
When Texas adopted Canon 3 A(7) in 1976, that left Colorado as the 
only state in the present which maintained a televised trial program 
conceived in the early era. Yet the Colorado program, which WdS adopted 
in 1956, is more characteristic of the TV trial programs which exist 
today than of the sporadic experiment s which made up the first televised 
tri .als . It was the exception to the rule w ich prevailed during the first 
era of televised trials . 
That the Colorado program differs fro~ otrcr TV trials of the time 
is made clear by the manner in which it was adopted . The first televised 
trials were allowed at the discretion of individual trial judges prior 
to~ particular trial and were approved or rejected by a higher court. 
In Colorado, televised trials were approved by the Supreme Court 
(before any trials were televised) in a quasi -l egislative hearing. 
Several television stations had requ ested that the Slupreme Court consider 
changing Canon 35 to allow television camera coverage of court proceedings. 
The hearing was not a typical judici al proceeding , but it was in some 
ways a mini -l eg i s lative hearing. This new method of considering whether 
or not to allow a televised trial was to become the trademark of the 
televised trial prog r ams of the present . 
On the 1 2th of December, 1955, the Colorado Supreme Court appointed 
one of its members, Justice Otto Moore, to conduct the hearing to 
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reconsider Canon 35 . The Court felt that , since the Canon had come out, 
the media had not a chance to prove their sid of the issue : 
Admittedly , no opportunity has been afforded to those who 
claim injury or loss of right by enforcement of the Canon 
in question to make known to this court in an orderly and 
authorized manner the facts . the law and the argument upon 
which their claims are grounded. 1 
The hearings before Justice Moore began on January 30 , 1956, and 
~ent on for six days. Many witnesses appeared at the hearing and much 
2quipment was demonstrated by camera coverage of the proceedings. In 
fact , Justice Moore noted: 
At least one hundred photographs were taken at various stages 
of the hearing which were printed and introduced as exhibits . 
All of them were taken without the least disturbance or inter-
ference with the proceedings, and , with one or two exceptions, 
without any knowledge on my part that a photograph was being 
taken. A newsreel operated for half an hour without knowledge 
on my part that the operation was going on . Radio microphones 
were not discovered by me until my attention was specifically 
directed to their location ... Cameras used in photo and tele-
vision demonstrations were of different kinds . In still photo-
graphy and newsreel activity they were not noticeable and 
were operated in such a manner that I was unaware that they 
were functioning . 2 
The television cameras demonstrated varied from a "la rge, already out-
:noded one which is mounted on a moveable tripod, to the small one 
which is 4" x 5" by 7 11 • 3 
After the hearing, Justice Moore began a careful analysis of the 
issues in televising a trial. He saw TV trials as walking a fine line 
betwee n the constitutional guarantees of free press and fair tri a l: 
In the instant case we must take precautionary measures to 
guard against two dangers: first, lest under the guise of 
preserving dignity and decorum in the court cases the civil 
li bertie s guaranteed under our Bill of Rights be unnecessarily 
invaded or nullified; second, lest using the Bill of Rights 
as a cloak individuals are permitted "to detract from the 
essential dignity or the proce eding s , distr ac t the witness 
_n giving h is testimony, degrade the court , and create 
nisconceptions wi t h res pe ct th e r eto in the mind of the 
public , " by t he use of camera, radiu or c0levision in the 
cou r se of a trial . 4 
Thus, television media and trial jud ges must try to find a "happy medil.1!'1111 
in wh_ch ne ither the right s of the p ress nor the rights of the defendant 
wiL be den ied. 
"he C!duc ution.:il value of the t c]cviscd tria l w su n important :i.s,ue 
for Justice Moore. In resJJonse to the argument that:. TV tria ls would 
ser- re only to satisfy idl e curiousity, he .. ade the following oft-quoted 
sta -::encnt : 
It is high l y inconsistent to complain of the ignorance 
and apat hy of voters and th en to " close the windows of infor-
nation through which they might observe and l ear n . " Generally 
only i dl e people , pursuing "idl e cur io sity " h ve time to visit 
court rooms in person . 5 
~uslice Moore a l so felt tha t the supporters of Canon 35 , while 
mearin g well , had made an incorrect assessment of televised tri als . 
He conmented that before the h e arin g he had been opposed to tel evision 
covera ge of proceedings bu t that he had changed hi s mind af ter his 
exposure to th e television camera . The supporters of Ca non 35 dis lik ed 
televi sed trials because they lacked any experience with one . Twenty - two 
years lat er , a trial judg e in Florida made the same statement. 
Just because Justice Moore supported tel ev i sed trials did not mean 
tha t he s upport ed t hem in all cases: 
Th ere arc doubtless many cases and portions thereof which , in 
thG court's di sc retion to insur e justice , would be withdrawn 
from reproduction by photo , fil m, radio or television. Th e 
res ons ibl e l e ad e rship in each of these fields are in agre e -
ment that the trial co urt should have comp l ete discretion to 
rule out all, or any part of , such activity in those instances 
where the proper administration of justice requires it. 6 
-,r: 
,. ) 
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Moore submitted his report to the rest of the Colorado Supreme Court 
on February 20th, and on the 27th, the Court unanimously adopted Moore's 
recommendation for a revised Canon 35, which reads as follows: 
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting 
dignity and decorum. 
Until further order of this Cou rt, if the trial judge 
in any court shal l believe from the particular circumstances 
of a given case, or any portion thereof, that the taking of 
photographs in the court room, or the broadcasting by radio 
or television of court proceedings would detract from the 
dignity thereof, distract the witness in giving his testimony, 
degrade the court , or otherwise materially interfere with 
the achievement of a fair trial, it should not be permitted; 
provided , however, that no witness or juror in attendance 
under subpeon a or order of the court shall be photographed 
or have his testimony broadcast over his expressed objection; 
and pr ovid ed furthe r that under no circumstances shall any 
court proceeding be photographed or broadcast by any person 
without first having obtained permission from the trial judge 
to do so, and then only under such regulations as s hall be 
prescribed by him .7 
Bar-Press Cooperation in the Colorado Program 
One thing which has distinguished the Colorado program from many 
of its contemporaries is the amount of cooperation between the media 
and the judges. In the Estes case, the relationship between the media 
and judge was more a peaceful co-existence (which was occasionally less 
than _peaceful ) than cooperation. In Colorado, however, the press came 
up with its own proceedures for the televising of a trial. Justice 
.Moore had recommended pooling of press facilities, but this was not his 
own ide a . It was proposed by Sheldon Peterson of KLZ radio and tele -
vision . To further facilitate pooling, Mr. Peterson came up with a 
proposal in which the 14 Denver radio stations and four television 
stat ions would go through a permanent organization, the Denver Area 
Radio and Television Association, in order th televise a trial. The 
Association would then work out the "ground rules" for coverage and the 
trial judge would only have to deal with one pcrson- - the Association ' s 
secretary--instead of media representatives from a numher of stations. 
In addition, equipment would be set up ahead of time and the Association 
mandated that "the judge must be fully satisfied with the installation 
before the trial begins . 118 
To assure that media conduct would consistently be reasonable, the 
association established some rules of conduct for the televising of a 
trial, (these rules are reproduced in Appendix 2) which would be updated 
C) 
annually. In addition to explaining the detailed process for working 
with the Denver Area Radio and Television Association, the rules an 
attorney and former judge in Colorado, noted that these "self-imposed 
rules and regulations have been adhered to scrupulously in the Denver 
Metropolitan area, and outside the Denver area where broadcasting has 
I 
10 been done in Colorado. " Clearly these rules do not have any actual 
coercive force behind them . However, TV stations do have an advantage 
in fol lo wing them in that, if the rules are followed , they may "insure" 
their being allowed to continue further coverage of televised trials. 
The rules do have one limitation in that they do not say anything 
about editing of material to be broadcast. The potential harm of this 
is illustrated by the Estes case, where only the prosecution 's arguments 
were televised. But in Colorado, th e situation seems to be different. 
Although there are no specific rules, "In all cases great care has gone 
into the editi ng and selection . Experience to date indicates th e major 
use is and will be in news broadcastings, in which time is so limited 
there is no opportunity for abuses by ... parties seeking to capitalize 
h f . . d. ,.11 upon t e uses o mass communication me ia. 
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In the 1970's, most if the state programs were to have various 
regulations imposed upon the media wishing to televise a trial. Co lora do 
re!JembJes these sL. tes in t.'1at it hcis standards laid out beforehand to 
2f3 
regulate the televising of court proceedings . The only difference is that 
the standards im Colorado were made and enforced by the media itself. 
The media's treatment of editing seems to suggest tha t even when the rules 
were not written, there were unwritten standards of reasonableness 
which the media followed voluntarily. 
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CHAPTER V 
TIIE PRESENT ERA OF TELEVISED TRIALS 
By the time the Estes decision came out, the prospects for televised 
trials looked dim . Almost all states had prohibited televised trials, 
and the Supreme Court had come quite close to ceclaring all such tria l s 
to be unconstitutional. In 1981 , the situation reversed. Although the 
federal courts continue to prohibit television coverage , approximately 
twenty - seven states permit televising, either on a pen nanent or exper i mental 
basis , of some court proceedings , although only twenty-one allow coverage 
' ' 1 
of criminal trials. This trend was climaxed when on January 26, 1981, 
the Supreme Court upheld the televising of t.:he trial of two ML:unj police 
officers, Noel Chandler and Robert Granqer , who had been convicted of 
2 burglary . 
Whi]e there is a great deal of vLriety in the present TV tri 1 pro -
grams, there are also some common factors . first of all , these programs 
are more appropriately called state programs than t he first te l evised 
trials . Te l evising of court pro c eedings in the SO ' s and e arly six t ies 
ha not only varied from sta t e t o state, but from court to c ourt . If 
a judge decided to allow telev i si on into the tr i a l, he wou ld make the 
rules caverning coverage . P r es ent ly , however , mat t e r s co nce rni ng 
television c o v erage are de t er min ed on a sta t ewide bas is. Tri a l judges 
usually have discret ion on cer t a in matt ers , but th i s discr e tio n is 
normally limi t ed by state procee dur es . 
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There are a l so some sirniliarities between these state procedural 
requi rem ents . Most states will allow only one or t wo television and 
still cameras in courtrooms . In addition, they usua ll y re qu ire the 
equipment be noiseless and that only ex isting lighting can be used. 3 
Mcst states also forbid coverage of certain tri als . Rape , child custody , 
divorce , trade secrets , and juve nil e pro ce edings are usually exempted 
4 from coverage . 
Present state programs d iff er from the earlier ones i n another 
significant respect- - the number of states involved . As noted above , 
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most states now allow televised trials whi l e in the fifties and early 
sixties TV trials were rare occu r rences . Thus , the history of the televised 
trial has taken a peculiar turn . When it was untried (bu t a l so officially 
uncondenmed) only a smal l mino rity of the states a llow ed it; but now , 
fifteen years after it was crit iciz ed by the h i ghest court in the land, 
it is allowed i n more states than it is not . 
Perhaps the most easily observable (and popularly emphasized) 
difference between t he TV trials of the present and those of the pa st 
is the change in technology which ha s occur ed between the two periods . 
Ronald Loewen , Execut ive Produce r of News for KAKE-T V, notes th at 
television stations now have "c ompact e l ectronic c ame r as that opera te 
in extr emely low ligh t levels, are absolutely noise l ess, and produce 
high - quality pictures . 115 He also points out that there are "parabolic" 
microphones which can be in s talled on a television camera and pick up 
a conversation "several yards away ," and wirel ess mic r ophones which 
are as sma ll as a man's l ittle finger wi t h transmitters " the size of 
two packs of cigarettes . 116 
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The importance of this change in technology should not be over-
stated, however . After all, Justice Otto Moore in Colorado had noted 
that during the hearing, many of the cameras were operating without his 
knowledge and that he did not notice the microphones until they we re 
pointed out to him. That was in 1956. Of course, this does not mean 
that the improvement in technology since 1956 js not important, merely 
that it should not be overemphasized to the exclusion of other factors . 
State Proqrams in the "Modern" Era 
The above generalizations provide a kind of vague outline of the 
"modern" televised trial, but a more detailed picture can be obtained by 
considering a few state programs in depth. The most important program by 
far is Florida ' s. There are several reasons for this. First , the Florida 
program is a permanent one. Only eight states have permanent programs; 
the rest allow television on a temporary or experimental basis. Second, 
the Florida program was the one reviewed and approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in Chandler v Florida . It is therefore likely to serve as 
a guideline for future televised trial programs . 7 (Indeed, it has a lr eady 
done so since it was used as a guide for the Wisconsin program .) Finally, 
the Florida program is important because it is one of the few states 
which allows televised trials without the consent of the defendant. 
J 
The Leader of the Pack: The Florida Program. 
On February 24, 1975, two Florida television stations petitioned the 
Florida Supreme Court for a proce edin g to consider the possible rejection 
by the Court of Canon 3 A(7) . As a result of this petition , th e Florida 
Supreme Court, in June of 1977, initiated a one-year experiment with 
televised trials during which it re fused to hear constitutional appeals 
Jased on the presence of television cameras in the courtrooms. 8 The 
:::ourt had originally tried to limit the experiment to just a few judicial 
:listricts and require the consent of all trial participants . When they 
,1ere unable to conduct any trials with television coverage because they 
:::ould not receive any consent, they changed the rules to allow coverage 
,.iithout consent . 
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The petition of the television stations had emphasized the technological 
:levelopments in media equipment which would enable trial coverage without 
iny distraction of trial participants. 9 Since the majority in the Estes 
:::ase had ambiguously agreed that new technology might create a situation 
to which their ruling would be inapplicable, the Florida experiment was not 
e:::essarily in contradiction with tho Estes ruling. After accepting the 
_?et:.ition, the court set up some rath,)r rigorous sL.:mclan1s for the conduct 
f . 1 . h . . 10 J tria s wit television coverage: 
1) The court allowed only one audio pickup sysLent, and existing audio 
fa:ilities were to be used for this purpose whenever possible . Only one 
celevision camera (either film or videotape) and one s till camera 
?hJtographer , who could operate at most two cameras , would be allowed to 
co?er proceedings. In addition, the court limited the types of cameras 
whtch could be used, specifying them by name of the manufact urer and 
moiel number of the camera. The still cameras tJ be used could emit 
c l i.cks no louder than those made by a 35 mm Leica " M" Series Rangefinder 
canera . The court was even more restr ic tiv e when it came to television 
caneras, as it li sted the spec ific came r as which could be used and pro -
hiJited all others. 
2) When more than one station wished to cover a trial , they would 
be forced to "pool" equipment and personnel. This was the responsibility 
of the media , c1nd they were not, un r1, ·r ,.my circumstances , to cc1ll in 
the trial judge to resolve their disputes. If the media could not agree 
on which of Lhe several television stations present should run the 
camera, the court mandated that the right should go to whoever set 
up first and that the ''presiding jud ge shall exclude all contesting 
media personnel from a proceeding ." 
3 ) Media personnel were prohibited from m,ing any flashes or bright 
lights o~ either the television or still cameras . Existing lighting was 
to be the only source of light, and if this proved insufficient, it would 
have to be modified at the expense of the media. 
4) The exact location of the c.::i.rneras in the courtroom was to be 
determined by the Chief Judge of the circuit in which the trial was to 
be held. The only restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court was that 
the location provide "reasonaole access to coverage . " Once th e cameras 
had been placed, however, the court forbade the cameramen to move about 
the courtroom and take pictures . In fac t, their movement was so restricted 
that they couldn't even replace film in their cameras except during a 
recess . 
5) Al l equipment which was not a "competent part of a television 
camera," (such as a videotape recorder), were required by the court to 
be contained outside of the courtroom in a separate room, when s uch a 
room was available . 
6) Audio pickup of conferences between the defendant and his 
attorney or bench conferences between attorneys and the judge was 
prohibited. 
hcse standards thus hc1d an ad nntage over the sta ndards of the 
court in the Lyles cc1se because they were even more precise . Under the 
Lyles standards , a trial judge could have felt that he was conforming 
to the vague guidelines without rec1lly providing any adequate protection 
for the defendant. In Chandler v Florida, however , the United States 
Supreme Court noted that the Florida standards "placed on trial judges 
positive obligations to protect the fundamental right of the accused to 
a fair . 11 trJ .al." These st~1dards were indeed explicit enoug h to force a 
"-s:iositive obligc1tion" on the trial judc;e. They were , in fact , quite 
strict. One of the Florida Supreme Court judges , wnile concurring 
with the rest of the court in adopting the standards , felt that "the 
standards promulgated by the majority go fur~her than necessary ... 
12 
I would establish fc1r less restrictive stc1ndards ." 
During this one year ezperimental period, several notorious trials 
were televised. The first of these was State v Zamora . In thi s case , 
Ronny Zamora, a 14-year old boy , was co nvic ted of murdering an elderly 
woman and stealing her car and 415 dollars. The facts of the crime 
alone were enough to make it highly pub licized, but this tria l was 
also newsworthy . Ronny Zamora was tried as an c1dult in a televised 
trial, and he claimed as a defense that violent police shows like 
Kojak had created a "mental condition of insanity . .. diseasing his mind 
14 
and imparing his behavioral co ntrol s ." The Zamora trial thus clearly 
fit into the " heavily public ized and highly sensational " category 
condemned by Justice Harlan in Estes. The Zamora trial bore another 
similiarity to the Estes case in that televising was allowed without 
the consent of the accused. 
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In genera l, the reaction to th e Zamora tri 1 was favorable . Trial 
Judge Paul Baker, who had before th e tria l said that he was horrified 
at the thought of a televised trial, 15 said lh t the trial "must be 
16 
viewed as a success . " Judith Kreeger, a Miami lawyer , commented 
"There were no theatrics. The cameras didn't intrude. The public 
got to see what goes on . That ' s· the way it should be . 1117 
The Zamora trial was not without its problems, however . h'hen the 
media originally set up their lighting, Judge Baker noted that the 
cc1bles snaked across the floor and the heat - producing l i ghts mounted 
on the walls made the courtroom look. like a "llolly.vood sound stage 11 
and ordered them removed. At this time , technology came to the rescue 
of the media in the form of several high intensity bulbs which the media 
3(, 
technicians were able to insert into the existing light fixtures and which 
were , in Judge Baker's words, 
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"neither distracting nor uncomfortable . " 
Another problem occurred when the media p e rsonnel blocked the 
corridors of the courthouse as they tried to get pictures of trial 
participants entering and leaving th e courtroom. The corridors were 
cleared after Judge Baker requested it . In explaining his reasons for 
making such a request , Judge Baker said : 
The Cour t took the position that uccess to the ac tual 
trial proceedings in the pilot program was a major step 
in the media's favor . In exchange therefore the media 
should refrain from having cameras and lights in th e 
corridors for the purpose of photographing trial partici-
pants and eliciting interviews. In the Court's op inion 
what transpired in the courtroom is a factual accou nt of 
the trial which is news , but what is e l icted in th e 19 
corridors takes on the color of editorial comment ." 
Juege Baker had also felt the need to tell announcers to "admonish 
the public not to 'set their minds upon a determinat i on of any issue 
h h . . . . 20 forte reason t ey were n ot seeing the trial in its entirety' ... " 
1) In any televised trial where there is a jury, the jurors should 
be sequeste red. 
2) There shou ld be a pre -trial conference between the judge and 
the medi a , and the media liaison person should be appointed . Judge Baker 
had done this in the Zamora trial , appointing Steve Tello, news manager 
of one of the local stations, as this liaison . 
Any matters that required clarification were communicated 
to the cour t through Mr. Tello and in turn he conveyed in-
structions to the media from the court . 
In no instance did any member of the media attemot to 
bypass the court-appointed liaison and in no instance did 
any member of the media fail to cooperate with instructions 
of the court relayed through Mr . Tello.2 1 
It is interesting to note the simi li ar iti es between this procedure and 
the voluntary use of a liai son by the Denver Area Radio and Television 
Association (sec Apµendix 2) . 
3) lvitnesses should be advised by the judge not to watch any part 
of the trial on television. 
4) Any attorney or judge who "solicits media coverage of a trial 
for personal or pol itical motives " sl1ould be severely punished . 
In this re port , Judge Bake r refuted the objections to televi sed 
trials posed by the plurality in the Estes case, po int ing out that no 
such problems had occurred in Zamora . In ref ere nce to Justice Harlan's 
statement that the time for televised trial s might come in the future , 
Judge Baker said: 
The day has indeed arrived when television is common place 
in our daily lives. Technical advances over the last ten 
years have made equipment less obtrusive, and the maj orit y 
of media personnel have come to view their role as the 22 
conscience of the community with greater respons ibility. 
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Upon the conclusion of the one-year experiment, the Florida 
Supreme considered whether or not the program would be made permanent. 
In making this decision they had the advantage of two surveys: one 
of trial participants conducted by the Office of the State Courts 
Administrator, and one of judges which was conducted by the Florida 
Conference of Circuit Judges . 
this chapter . ) 
(Both these surveys are discussed in 
With all of its available data in front of it, the Florida Supreme 
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Cou rt considered the arguments for and against the coverage of televised 
trials . The court considered six different arguments against the 
telev is ing of courtroom proceedings: physical disruptions, psychological 
effects of coverage, exploitation of court coverage by the media for 
entertainment purposes, prejudicial publicity, the effects of coverage 
on particular kinds of witnesses , and the privacy rights of trial 
part icipants. After considering all of these reasons , the court dismissed 
them as insignificnat . It is interesting that the court admitted that 
there might be psychologica l impact, exploitation by the media, and 
prejudicial publicity in television coverage, but it dismissed these 
arguments on the ground that these problems might well occur even in a 
trial covered exclusively by the print media . 
The court considered many argument s of the media as to why television 
cameras shou ld be admitted into trials, but the only valid reason they 
considered for allowing coverage was that it would be consistent with 
open democratic governmnet . The court said , "Ventilating the judicial 
process ... wil-1 enhance the image of the F l orida bench and bar and 
thereby elevate public confidence in the system." With this in mind, 
the court made the Florida program permanent , saying "Ive are persuaded 
th at on balance there is more to be gc1ined thitn lo st by permitting 
electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings subject to stc1ndards 
23 fo.::- such coverage ." 
The Court then changed Canon 3 A(7) of its Code of Judicial Conduct 
to read a.s follows : 
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding 
judge to (i) control the conduct of proceedings before the 
court, (ii) Ensire decorum and prevent distractions , and 
(iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending 
cause, cle,tronic media and still photoqritphy coverage of 
public judicial proceedings i n the appellate and trial 
courts of this state shall be allowed in accordance with 
standards or conduct and technology promulagated by the 
Supreme Court of Florida . 24 
With this change in Canon 3 A(7) , Florida made permanent what was, from 
the media ' s perspective, the most l iberal program of televised trials in 
the country . 
Other State Programs 
\vhile the Florida expcdnent is the most prominent progr.::i.m of 
televised trials in the "modern " era, it is by no means the only one . 
In addition to Florida , there are seven states with peYmanent programs: 
Georgia , New Hampshire , Nevada , Washington, Wisconsin , and , of course, 
25 
Colorado . Several other states , including Californ ia, Idaho, 
Lousiana, Minnesota , Montana , New Je rsey, North Dakota , Ohio , Oklahoma , 
West Virgin ia, Alaska , and Arizona are exper1ment i ng with television 
coverage of some court proceedi ngs (either trial or appe llate). 
Despite the great var i ety and number of progr~ns seve r al state programs 
are surprising l y similar , while others tend to be qui t e original. An 
analysis of a few state programs will show how tl is i s so . 
39 
I) 0 
Wis consin: In Florida ' s Image 
In April of 1978, th e Wisconsin Supreme Court began a one - year 
experiment witl1 television coverage of trials, which was later extend d 
to f ifte en months . During this period, trials were co ve re d without the 
conse nt of the trial participants , as is the case in Florida . Participants 
could , however, request that the judge prohibit cameras if there was 
sufficient cause to do so. By "cause," the Supreme Court meant more 
than "th e des ire not to be pho togra phed ... " it was "a reasonable fe ar 
f d b h l 'k ,, 26 o un ue em arassment, or t e i e. Outside of this r ather vague 
guideline , the Wisconsin rule re sembl ed that of Florida . 
Upon completion of the experiment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
followed in th e footpri nt s of Florida by, on July 1, 1979 , changing its 
Canon 3 A(7) to allow television cov erage of trial and appe llat e proceedings . 
The final rule adopted by the Wisconsin Court, however , diffe red f r om 
Florida ' s in one impor tant respect . Florida had chosen not to specify 
certain classes of trials which might be exempt from television cove rag e , 
and instead l eft the matt er up to the tria l j udge . Wisconsin went beyond 
this by listing certain cases wh ich s houldn't be televised: 
In cases involving the vict ims of crimes, including sex 
crimes, police in formants , undercov e r agents , relocated 
witnesses , and juvenil e s, and in e vid e nti a ry suppression 
hearings , divorce proceedings , and cases involving trade 
secrets , a presump tio n of val i dity attends the re q uests 
[ to prohib it television coverage] ; the trial judge shall 
exercise a broad d i scretion in deciding whether th e re is 
cau se for p rohibition . This li st of r eques ts which en joy 
the res umption is not exclus iv e; the judge may in his or 
her discret ion find cause in comparable situatio n s . 2 7 
The Wisconsin p ro gram bore anoth er res emblance to the F lor ida 
program in using research on t e lev i sed t rial s to h e lp it make it s 
decision to make the program pe rman ent . A committee appo i nted by 
th~ Supreme Court had surveyed 55 judges in Wisconsin and found that 
44 approved of televised trials whil e only eight "cl ea r ly opposed the 
')8 
pr:i.ctice . 11 -
Alabama : The Colorado Resemblance 
I) l 
The Supreme Court of Alabama char.ged Canons 3 P.. ( 7A) and ( 7B) to allow 
television coverage of trial and appellate courts if all trial participants 
29 
ccnsented. The s tandards aCop ted are basically the same as those in 
Cclorado , leaving the ultimate decision of whether or not television coverage 
· 1 b · 1 d · , · d 30 w1 l ea~ owe up to the tria- JU ge. 
There is a striking di=ference b e tween the Colorado and Alabama 
programs, however . In Alabama , before any par t icular courtroom can be 
u~ed as a site of a televised trial a detailed plan desc r ibing camera 
placement, lighting and wiring procedures , "with the objective of 
31 
sc.fcgua r ding the dignity of the court.room ," · must be submitted -to and 
approved by the Supreme Court . This plan must be submitted "jo intly by 
tte judge , district attorney , president of the local bar ass oc iation , 
and the chairman of the county commissioners." Thus , each a nd every 
courtr0om has it s own detailed guidelines for the p lac ement of medi a 
equipment. 
Tennessee : An Innovative Id ea 
The Tennessee Supreme Court c hanged its Code of Judicial Cond uct 
temporarily in February of 1979 . The rule change will remain in effect 
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" as lo ng as th e media behave ." This sort of permanent temporary rul e 
represents an unusual procedure for a state allowing television coverage 
of court proceedings . The trend is for a state to experiment with 
television cover age and then, if the media has sh own that it c an handle 
i tself , the experiment is made permanent. 
Under the Tennessee rule , writtun consent is required of the accused 
if a tri al is to be televised . In addition , the parties or their attorneys 
may hav e television coverage discontinued at any time during the trial, 
and any juror or witness who objects to any coverage of himself may 
prohobit his picture being taken , although other segments of the trial 
. 33 
may still be televised . 
It is interesting to not~ that , despite the tremendous variety of 
programs in the "modern" era, there are some important similiarities . 
First of all , all the states have adopted their televised trial programs 
either throug11 the highest court in the state or through a judicial 
committee appoinL--d by the highest court in the state (the cc1se in 
California, Wisconsin , and Colorado). In fact, Nevada's Supreme Court 
initiated its permanent program in direct contradiction with an existing 
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state statute . Thus, the "modern" programs of televised trials are 
judicially created, but, since this is done in advance, through the 
highest court in the state, the programs are statewide and premeditated, 
like a legislative mandate . 
Research in the "Modern" Era 
When the Estes decision came out in 19 65 , there was no evidence 
which would indicate exactly what effects television coverage of trials 
would have. The Court had contended that television coverage might 
adversely affect a trial by dist ra ct ing or inh ibiting trial participants, 
yet even the Court admitted that th ese arguments were base d on 
" con ject ure and hy po th esis ." Justic e Clark, speaking for the plura lit y , 
had not ed, "It is true that our empirical knowledg8 of 1television'sl fu ll ~ -
effect on the public , the jury or the participants in a trial, including 
/) 1 
' d ' d ' ' ' d ,,35 the JU ge , witnesses an lawyers , is l1m1tc . Since then, the situation 
has ch.:tnycc.1 somcwk1t . l\llhough to d.:tlc Lllcn' has bcc11 only one " ,.,cicnti[ic" 
study co ncerning the effects of television coverage -- it was a study on the 
impact of television on witnesses which was performed by Professor James 
Hoyt--th ere have been many surveys which , while not as useful as a 
controlled experiment , do provide some useful answers to the · questions 
posed by the Estes court. 
Surveys 
There have been a lurge nurnber of surveys conducted about televised 
trials (although only a few will be discussed here) but , by and large , 
only certain types of surveys are useful. A general survey of lawyers 
asking the~ what they think of televised trials does not shed much light 
on the subject of the effect of televised triJls . A survey of part icip ants 
in a televised trial, however, can give a qeneral idea of the impcat of 
the tel evision camera . 
This type of survey is plagued with a special prob l em , however. 
Sometimes it may concern itself with television coverage to the 
exclusion of other factors . This a surgey which shows that 30'.o of the 
trial partici pa nts thought the presence of television harmed a trial is 
useless if 25% felt that the mere presence of reporte r s harmed it. 
To prove this point , TV c-tation WPLG of Miami conducted an " admittedly 
imperf ect" telephone survey in which randomly selected respondents in 
two Florida counties were asked i f "the presence of newspaper reporters 
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and sketch artists affects the testimony of witnesses in a negative way? " 
About 30% of the 262 people surveyed said yes. 
The su rveys on televised tr i als roughly addressed the very issues 
stated in the Estes; that is , they are concerned with the effect of 
television on the public , on trial 1 ~r ticipanl!; , and on judges. 
Televised Trials anu the Public 
In 1979 , a research team at the University of Wisconsin conducted a 
4'1 
survey of the residents of two Wisconsin cities . Interviewers telephoned 
258 people and asked them some questions about the tria l of Jennifer Patri. 
who had been convicted of murder but acquitted of arson in a tel ev ised 
trial. The actual trial had been conducted in a third city , miles away 
from the two cities in which the poll was conducted . Table l shows the 
results of this survey . It is significant tc note that , although the 
trial had been televised , 36t of the peop le surveyed never heard how it 
came out (Question 4 , Table 1) . 
TABLE 1 
KNrnvLEDGE OF 'I'HE JENNIFER PATRI TRil\L 
Questions Correct Incorrect No Respo nse Response Response 
1 ) Unaided recall of Patri ' s name 16% 7% 77% 
2) l,ided recal l of Patri's name 75 90 2% 23% 
3) Recall of murder motive 61% 10% 29% 
4) Reca ll of trial outcome 5 96 59 90 36% 
5) Recall of judge's name 14 90 11 % 75% 6) Reca ll of prosecutor ' s name 7% 4% 89% 
7) Recall of defense attorney ' s name 15% 3°0 82% 
SOURCE: Kermit Netteburg , "Does Research Support the Estes Ban on 
Cameras i n the Courtroom? " Judicature 63 (May 1980) , p. 472 . 
Surveys of Lawyers and Trial Part ic ipants 
As tie Florida experiment c~~e to close, a research team from the 
University of Centra l Florida surveyed 540 F lorid a lawyers (of which 
247 responded) and asked them several ques t ions about te levised tria l s . 
'I'he survcyers ma C' the interesting discovery thi"it "attorneys with Cilmcra 
experience were in general not quite as negative about TV coverage 
as those who did not hnve live camera experience . " 37 The remarks of 
Justice Moore of Colorado made over twenty years before were thus born 
out in statistics. 
The Florida Supreme Court had commissioned its o,:n survey on 
televised trials. A research team from Florida State University was 
supposed to conduct the survey but they chose a method which proved to 
be impractical. The Florida Court then requested that the Office of 
the State Courts Administrator (OSCA) perform the survey, which was of 
all trial participants except judges. The respondents were divided 
into four groups: witnesses, attorneys, court personne l (bailiffs, clerks 
and court reporters) , and jurors . n scpnrate questionairc was made up 
IJ 5 
[or each of these CJroups , al tl1ough scvcrol of the questions were simi l ar . 
The survey was by no means empi rical; it merely reflected ''the respondents' 
• d d • I 38 attitu e3 an perceptions .' 
In general, the OSCA survey found that , while e le ctro nic coverage 
did tend to influ ence the trial participants in some cases, the effect 
it had was slight. See Table 2 for answers provided to specific questions . 
In the very least, the OSCA survey seems to indicate that whi l e television 
coverage does seem to affect a trial, it is not as disruptive as the Estes 
court postulated . 
Surveys of Judges 
Although the OSCA survey did not pertain to judges , the Florida 
Supreme Court did have the advan tag e of a survey conducted by the Florida 
Conference of Circuit Judges. About two thirds of the judges polled in 
this survey previously had some experience with television coverage of 
TARH~ 2 
SURVEY uF TRIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FLORIDA EXPERIMENT: 
EFFECT OF TELEVISION AND STILL CAMERA COVERAGE ON TRIAL 
Question::, 
Asked 
Disrupt trial? 
A.;areness of media 
presence 
Effect on ability to 
jud ge truthfulness 
of wttnesses 
Made sclf - conciou0 
Effect on ability 
to concentrate 
on testimony 
r-:ore responsible 
for actions 
More attentive 
or nervous 
Ca:.ise any distraction 
Cause any dis Lrac-U.on 
Urge to see self 
on media 
Did media rircsence 
:nake witness 
testimony seem 
mor,J important? 
Concern over harm as 
a result of elcc-
J. • L,ronic coverage as 
opposed to print 
covera.q;e 
Made attorneys 
more flamboyant 
Made witnesses 
more flamboyant 
Witnesses inhibited 
& jurors nervous, 
self-consc iou s or 
distracted 
Jurors more attentive 
Respondents 
Question,; 
Were 
Directed At 
All 
All 
Attorneys & 
Jurors 
All 
Juror-
Jurors & 
Wi tnesse~:; 
All 
Jurors 
A Ltorney;; & 
Wi tnes::;u; 
Juror::; & 
Wi tne:::;sr:,~ 
Jurors 
All 
Attorneys & 
Court 
Personnel 
Attorneys & 
Court 
Personnel 
Attorneys & 
Cour t 
Personnel 
Attorneys & 
Court 
Personnel 
Moderate h 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
None 
(x) ·lHE· 
(x) 
(x) 
(x) 
SOURCE: In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations , 370 Southern Reporter , 
2d series , 766-9 , 
*OriGinal response scale was a 5-point spectrum but since all responses 
were in the lower half of the scale that is all that is shown here. 
**Responses were split between slight and none . 
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trials, and of tnese judges ove r a third were in favor of television 
coverage while another third were neutral, although making favorable 
comments about television coverage . Only 29 of the 96 judges who had 
· · d . . . 39 experience with televise trials were opposed to television coverage . 
In addition , 90 - 95% of the judges surveyed felt that jurors, witnesses , 
and lawyers "were not affected in the oerformance of their sworn duty 
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by the presence of electronic media . " There were, however, some strong 
reservations voiced by most judges surveyed . They were greatly concerned 
about maintaining control of proceedings in the courtroom and in preventing 
undercover agents, crime victims, and juvenile proceedings from being 
photographed. Aside from these reservations, the response was favorable . 
Judge Arthur Franza, who had conducted the survey, felt that , in general, 
juclges "do not obj e ct to the use of cameras in the courtroom now that 
they hc1ve had some experience . " 
The Hoyt Study 
While there have been countless surveys about televised trials 
conducted, there has to date been only one control l ed study on the effects 
of television coverage of trial p r oceedings . Th i s was done by the Univ -
ersity of Wisconsin Professor James Hoyt , whose study exp l ored the effec t s 
of television coverage on witnesses. Hoyt did not use any actual trial 
witnesses but " created" witnesses by having some randomly selected 
students view a film and answer some questions about what they saw . Hoyt 
said that the ''study simulated some of the pressure placed on witnesses 
in a courtroom setting while at the same time maintaining experimental 
40 
control so the results could be meaningfully analyzed. " 
Professor Hoyt divide d the participants into three group s: those who 
would be questioned in the presen c e of a television cam e ra which was out 
in the open ; those e:.uestioned with a television camera concea l ed behind 
a two - way mirror; and thos e question ed with no camera present . When the 
cameras wer e p resent (even when conc ea led) the subjects were shown where 
48 
the cameras were and were told that the cameras would rec ord-their testimon y 
on videotapes which would at a later time be seen by " . .. a large number 
of people ." ~hen the cameras were nol present , the interviewer told th e 
subjects that notes of their answers would be t.aken and later be shovm 
to a l arge number of people . The point of this was th a t the choice 
b tween televisjon coverage and a faci.mile of tradi ti ona l news pape r 
. d d 41 co verage instea of TV coverage an no ot h er coverage at all. 
The resulLs oE the study were somewha t surpr i sing . F irst of all , it 
was noted that there was no substantia l difference betwee n the answers 
provided by thos e coverec=l by a hidd en came r a and those without any 
cam er a at a ll. "It was as if when the cam era was out of sight it was 
. [ ] 42 
also out of their the subj ec ts tho ugh ts and concern s . " 
Even more surprising results cam e out concerning the difference 
b etw een obtrusive camera coverage and both hidden camera and no camera. 
In general, Hoyt found that whe n the camera was easy to see , th e subjects 
provided longer answers (an average of 14 more words) than when no 
camera was used . In addition , there was about 15 % increase in the correct 
amoun t of information when the cameras were obtrus i ve whi l e t here was no 
significant difference in the number of incorrect responses . Th u s , it 
seems, the opposite of what the Supreme Court in Estes said woul d happen 
seems to be true . The Hoyt study sug ges ts that, television coverage , 
instead of harming witness testimony as was contended in Estes , might 
actually help it by somehow getting the witnesses to provide more correct 
information. Hoyt said that, " ... in this context television cameras 
can, in fact, lead to a fairer trial. 1143 It is interesting to compare 
these results to the above-mentioned OSCA survey which found tha t, while 
television coverage did make participants self -c onscious to a degree, 
it also made them slightly more attentive (see Table 2, above) . 
There is one limitation to the Hoyt study, however . While it 
attempted to resemble a. "courtroom setting" as much as possible, it cou l d 
not duplj_cate all of the factors of a trial. For instance , the subjects 
were not in an adversary environment . Nor would their answers send a 
man to jail or set him free . This does not mean that the study is 
inaccurate, merely that it is imperfect. It was "an experimental 
49 
approximation of some of the key aspects of the courtroom environment. It 
. b . 1 . . ,,44 
was not, quite o VJ_ous y, a trial itselt. In genera l, it seems that 
two thin gs can safel y be inferred from the Hoyt study . First , if the 
camera is hidden from sight , it tends to be forgotten and thus has no 
significant impact on witness testimony. Second, if the camera is 
out in the open, it has a favorab le effect on witness testimony . 
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CP.APTER VI 
CHANDLER v FLORIDA : CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSION 
The first era of televised tri als had concluded wi th a decision of 
the United States Sup r eme Court . I n the same manner, th e present e ra 
has been cl im axed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Chandler v Florida. 
There was a significa nt difference between the two rulings, h owever , 
because the court in the Chandler decision upheld the televis i ng of a 
criminal trial , so long as no actual prejudice of the proceedings caused 
by the television coverage was sho wn . 
The Chandler case began wi th the 1977 robbery of a Miami r estaura nt 
by two police officers, Noel Chand l er and Robert Granger. Since their 
tr ·a 1 took place in 1978 , it had been televised as a part of Florida's 
one - year experiment . The case was unusual in that some of the evidence 
against them consisted of a tape r ecording of a radio conve rsation t he 
two officers had made while planning the robb er y. The conversation, 
which had been held at 2:30 a .m., was recei ved and r ecorded by a ham 
radio operator, who by sheer chance, had been li s tenin g to his radio 
. 1 
at the time. 
The two police officers had a ppea l e d their convictions, on the 
groun d s that the television coverage of their trial had violated their 
cons ti tutiona l ri ghts to a fair tri al. They did not show that televi s ion 
cove ra ge ac tuall y hurt their trial but inst ead relied on Estes as a rule 
that TV trials were per se unconstitutional. Since the Florida Supreme 
Court refused to hear con s titutional appeals based on televisi on 
53 
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coverage dur i ng the experimenta l period , the appeal went straight to the 
Supreme Cour t of the United States . 
In his opinion for the unanimous majo rit y in Chandler , Ch i ef Justice 
Burger carefully limited the scope of the Court's rev i ew to a determination 
of whether er net there was a constitut i onal v i olation . "In this setting," 
he said, " because this Court has no supervisory authority over state 
courts , our review is confined to whether there is a constitutional 
violation . 112 This statement by Burger was more than just an expression of 
procedure; Burger wished to make it perfectly clear that, although the 
Court wa s affirming Chandler ' s conviction, it was not approvi ng TV trials. 
Burger had further noted that , while there "mischevious pote nti alities " in 
allowing television coverage of court proceedings , "th e sta te s must be 
f . 3 ree to expe r iment . " The Cou rt said that , since there was no show in g 
of a constitutional violation, it could neither endorse or invalidate the 
Florida program . In short, Chand l er v Florida was a permiss ion slip for 
the states. 
The Court's permiss i on was not unconditional, how eve r. It noted that 
"a defendant h as the rig ht on review to show that the media's cov e rage 
of his case -- printed or broadcast- - compromised the ability of the jury to 
j udge him fairly." 4 It must be shown that som e harm re s ulted from the 
presence of tele visio n cameras since the Court was unwilling to assume harm 
as it had in t he Estes case. Furthermore , thi s harm must constitute more 
than jur or awareness of bro adcas t media. To show p rejudice, a defendant 
must prove either that "th e presence of cameras impaired the ability of 
the jur ors to decide the case on only the evidence before them" or that the 
trial parti ci pants were so distrac t ed or disturbed by "the presence of 
cameras and the prospect of broadcast" that the tria l was "affected 
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adversely ." In short , the decendant has the burden of proof on appea l 
to p r ove that the prcscnc0 UL elevision cameras ha r med his trial. The 
Chandler Court thus requires that an appeal based on t e levision co verage 
of a trial meet the same burden as an appeal or any other grounds. 
The Chandle r decisio n does not go any further th iln allowing s tate 
experimentation with televised trials, however. In July of 19 80 , the 
Supreme Court had, in Richmond Newspapers v Virginia , stated t hat the 
h . . 6 press as a right of ar::ccss to trials. This decision does not, however , 
apply to televised trials . The Chandler Court noted that since the 
Florida program had denied that there was any right of access on the 
part of the television media, it was not an issue in the case . (748) No 
mention is made in the Clarndler decision o[ t..he c.::i.rlicr Richmond case . 
Clearly, the Supreme Court is statiny that there is no right of access 
for television cameras, but neither does it deny that such a right might 
exist in the future . It simply rem ains mute on the issue . At any rate , 
because the Chandler decision merely al l ows a nd does not approve te levi sed 
trials, a constitutional right of access will not likely come about for 
some time . 
Does Chand ler Contradict Estes? 
A great deal of time in the Chand l e r case was devoted to provi ng 
whe ther or not Estes was an absolu t e ban on television coverage 
of court proceedings . The cour t acknowledged that , if Estes was such a 
ban , they would "be obliged to app l y that holding and reverse the 
judgement under revie w." 7 After an analys i s of the Estes opinions, the 
Court held that "Estes is not to be rea d as announcing a constitutional 
5G 
r~le barring still photographic , radi o and television coverage in all cases 
d . 8 and un er all circumstances . " It wa s on this point that the two 
ccncurring ~ustices disagreca with tho majority . Justice Stewart, who 
had dissented in Estes, agreed with the majority that the Chandler 
Judgement should be affirmed but also felt that Estes announced a rule 
that television coverage was a pe r se denial of a defen~ant 's ·righ ts and 
9 
should th erefore be overruled. Justice White, who also concurred, agreed 
that Estes should be overruled whether the Estes decision is red "broadl y 
10 
or narrowly." In other words, Estes should be overruled regardless of 
what it is interpreted to mean . 
Clearly, the Estes decision was not a constitutional ban on television 
coverage of court. proceedings in all instances . Harlan's separate opinion 
prevented this. It said that only notorious TV trials are per se 
unconstitutionl; routine trials might be fairly televised . In showing 
that Estes was not a per se rule against TV trjaJs, the Chandler court 
had emphasized certain phrases in Harlan's opinion- - phrases such as "ca ses 
like this one''--to prove their point. But by those phrases Harlan had 
meant "no torio us cases." That Harlan felt notorious trials are per se 
unconstitutional is made clear by his admiss ion in the Estes that there 
had been no showing of any "isolate prejudice resulting from the presence 
11 
of television apparatus within the courtroom." Yet despite the fa ct 
that there was no showing of harm resultin g from television coverage of 
the Estes case , Harlan had been perfectly willing to reverse the conviction. 
Of course , certain cases which had been televised could be upheld 
under the Estes ruling, if they were notorious (or perhaps if the defendant 
had consented to coverage.) Yet the Chandler case is clearly notorious. 
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Justice Burger had noted that , due to the rath er unusual facts of tho case , 
. 12 Chandler h ad from the st.:irt "attrac ted the . art0ntion of the media ." 
l\dmittec:ly , there was quite a differ ence between the Estes and Chand l er 
cases . The F lori da progran had very pre cise standards which had been 
laid out and used before the Chandler trial was held . The standards 
i n the Estes case, however , had been gradually put together by the trial 
judge before and dur i n g the tria l. Ye t, lo gica ll y , this differ ence 
does not fi t into the Harlan opin io n , which had dete rmin ed constitutionality 
on the basis of the notoriety of the trial . Tho dissenters in Estes, 
however , did have a constituti onal rule which was based on the manner in 
which the t r ial was handled; they said that a trial was uncon stitutional 
only if " isolatable prejudice " could be shown. This is the v ery r ule 
asserted by t he majo rit y in the Chandler case . 
If there is a contradiction between the Estes and Chandler cases , 
then why does Justice Burger say there is none? Perhaps this can be 
understood by pretending that the decision in the Estes case had reached 
the same res ult but for different reasons . More precise l y , what if the 
Harla n opinion had stated that the reason for overru ling t he Estes case 
was the actua l, " iso la table prejudice " which had come about because the 
t ri al was televised . In Chandle r, Burger had said , "In sho rt, there 
is no s howing th a t the trial was compromise d by television covera ge , 
13 
as was the case in Estes ." ( empha sis added) I f Estes had r eache d th e 
same deci s ion becau se of actua l ha rm caused by televi s ion cove rage , then 
Burge r would have a club over the heads of th e television media. That 
is, the Cha ndl e r ruling uphel d t e l evised trial s as long as the med ia 
behaved , but this co nc ept is r a th er ambig uou s . To compensate , Bur g e r 
rei n terprets Estes to mean " this i s wh a t will hap pen if the media is 
not kept under control . " Logical l y , this is inconsistent , but it does 
have merit for public policy reasons . It may also be an ind i cation 
of what is mean t by "isolatablc prejudj,:c," although there is no way 
to know until another case comes befor e the Court . 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The evolution of televised trials from the f ir st TV trials to the 
present state programs is by no means comp l ete, as the Chandler dec isi on 
indicates. In fact , in some ways th ere has bee n no evolution . 
Colorado had adopted a "modern" program in 1956. Furthermore , t he Lyles 
case indicates that, even when the state does not lay out procedures 
ah e ad of time , a trial can be televised with no ill effect . In this sense , 
the distinction between the two eras of televi se d trials fades . The 
prese n t era of televised trials is still one of experimenta tion, as t he 
statements in Chandler and the smal l number o.f states with permanen t 
programs indicate. It i.s sim p ly wrong to say that we now live in the 
time Justice Ilarlan spoke of whe n he so.i.d tho.t the day may come when 
television may be so "commonplace " as to "d issipate all reasonable 
li k e lihood that its use in courtroo ms may disparage the judicial process." 
But this does not mean t hat this day will never come. Undoubtedly when it 
does com e , the Sup r eme Court will ap p ly the right of access created in the 
Richmond case to the television camera. 
Over the years, there has been some progress in the area of televised 
trials . Clearly , there has been a change in technology. This may not 
hav e utte rly changed the natur e of televised trials, but it certainly has 
helped. The media's substitution of high inten s ity bulbs for bright studio 
l ights in the Zamora case clearly indicates that, while the media may have 
been able t o fairly conduct the tri a l without technological advances, 
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increased technology made the job easier. 
The most significant difference between the first TV trials and the 
prcs<2nt s tate programs is the fact tlat the recent programs are care-
fully conceived by state supreme courts and precise guidelines for the 
conduct of the television media are laid out ahead of time. Again, the 
Lyles case shows that this could happen to an extent in the early trials 
but only if the trial judge took the trouble to lay them out ahead of 
time . Even then, the Lyles standards lacked the precision of present 
guidelines. 
Colorado stands as a rather unusual case. It conceived its program 
in the State Supreme Court, like the present p r ograms, yet it did this 
in 1956. The Colorado progrcm differs from the newer programs, 
however, in that the Court did not carefully lay out precise standards 
ahead of time--th e media did it themselves. One l ook at these standards 
(appendix 2) shows that they are about as precise as any court-proposed 
st a ndard. The longevity of the Colorado progra m indicates that these 
standards have no problem in pracrice. Thus, the Colorado stands as 
glaring proof that the standards for televising a trial need not be 
established by the courts. The important thing is that they exist. 
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Perhaps the difference between the two periods of teleivsion coverage 
of trials may be best understood in terms of an analogy . The court ' s 
experimentation with televised t r ials may be compared with a tightrope 
walker . When television first requested admittance to a courtroom, the 
courts were not quite sure what to do. They had had some experiemce 
with still camera coverage of p r ceedings , but these had long been 
condemned by Canon 35 . They seemed to be walking the tightrope for the 
first tim e , some, l ike Colorado , made it across but many fell to the 
gro und. By the seventies, however , the states had learned fro m their 
experiences . They more caref ully approached the wire, cautiously testing 
it with their feet. In addition , they have a so rt of balancin g p ole in 
their knowledge of mistakes, in improved t ec hn ology , and --in some 
cases-- in the use of modern resea rc h. Theyhave ' procedures which act as 
a ne t to catch th em if they fal l . The possibility for fai lur e sti ll 
exists , but it is greatly reduced . Perhaps someday televised trials 
wi ll h2ve become so advanced that the tightrope will be lowere d to the 
ground . Until then, states will , and pr obabl y should , continu e to 
experiment and gradually adopt permanent programs . 
APPENDIX I 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ESTES TRIAL 
Photograph 1 This photograph shows th e concentration and variety of 
television, newsreel and still picture cameras at the 
September pre-trial hearing. 
Photograph 2 . This photograph shows various cam eras f ocused on Billie Sol Estes 
a t th e September pre - trial h ea ring. Note the imposing television 
c ame r a a t the left and the ha ra ssed look of the defend ant (foreground) . 
Photogra ph 3. This photogr ap h shows the television booth as 
it appeared on the first day of the Estes tria l. 
Note how easily the cameras and media personne l 
can be seen through the slot in the booth. 
Photpgraph 4 . This photograph shows the television booth as it appeared after 
the tria l judge ordered that the camera slot be narrowed. 
APPENDIX 2 
DENVER AREA RADIO AND TELEVISION ASSOCIATION 
RULES OF CONDUCT FOR TELEVISED TRIALS 
DENVER AREA RADIO AND TELEVISION ASSOCIATION 
RULES OF CONDUCT FOR TELEVISED TRIALS 
1. /\11 TV and ardio coverage triaJ s must be pooled.* l\rranqcm nts 
to broadcast or photograph a trial, arraignment, argument on motion , or 
any other pre liminary hearing must be made through the coordinator of the 
Denver Area Radio and Television Association. Initial contact must be 
made only through the coordinator. 
2. When the coordinator has obtained permission , make certain that 
the personnel who cover the procee din gs contact the judte and introduce 
themselves and arrange to have the equipment s~t up prior to the opening 
of court. Explain to the judge what coverage is planned and, if the judge 
raises objections, modify plans to meet his objections . Also find out 
from the judge whether arrangements are to be made with the judge personally 
or with his clerk or bailiff. 
J. Always address the judge as "Your Honor," er " Judge ." 
4. l\lways ask permission of the clerk of bail iff to see the judge 
in hiw chambers. 
5 . Dress properly for court. coat and necktie are a must . 
6 . Regardless of how others may act in court , all radjo and TV 
personnel should conduct themselves with dignity and do everything 
possible to preserve the decorum of the courtroom . 
7. l\lways stand when the judge leaves or enters the courtroom and 
remain st.:mding until the jude;e has assumed his position upon the bench 
or las left the courtroom. 
8. Formal proceed i ngs in courtrooms, other than trials or matters 
preliminary thereto, such as swearing=in ceremonies or new jud ges, lawy er s , 
etc. , may be covered by radio and TV without contacting the Association's 
coordinator. Prior permission should be obtained from the presiding 
judge and all other rules of conduct as set out herein must be observed. 
If more than one station appears to cover the proceedings, ask the court 
if he desires pool coverage. If he does--pool . 
9 . Individual appearances of judges, attorneys, defendants, witnesses, 
jurors, or any parties in chambers or outside the courtroom should be 
handled with extreme care and discretion but need not be pooled . Always 
obtain prior permission from the judge for such coverage. 
*Any request for a pooling arrangement must be filed with the 
coordinator or with the station operating in court prior to the start 
of any trial session . 
In the event or a request to pool a radio tape to be copied from a 
film sound track, the delivery of such a tape shall be contingent upon the 
convenience of the TV station or stations holding the film. 
10. Do everything possible at all time to make the coverage as 
unobtrusive as possible and make sure that microphones, cameras , and 
other equipment CTrc as inconspicuous as possib l e . Care should be taken 
to make any wiring needed as unobtrusive as possible. 
11 . Do not use microphones or other equipment with visibl e station 
call letters in the courtroom. 
Your observance of these rules and the main t a in ing of proper 
dignity and decorum in the court \,•ill insure 011r being allowed acce.,s 
to the courts . 
(Source : Marshall Quait , "The Freedom of Pressure and the Explosive Canon 
35," Rocky Mountain Law Review, 53: 16-7, 1960.) 
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